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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

RICHARD RODRIGUEZ,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 940700-CA
Priority No. 2

:

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (1992), whereby a defendant in a
district court criminal action may take an appeal to the Court of
Appeals from a final judgment and conviction for any crime other
than a first degree or capital felony.

TEXT OF STATUTE AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The pertinent parts of the following rules, statutes and
constitutional provisions are provided in Addendum A:
Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15 (1995)
Utah Const, art. I, § 14
U.S. Const, amend. IV

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Did the trial court err in determining that the officer's
seizure and search of Appellant did not violate the Fourth
Amendment ?
Standard of Review:

This issue involves a question of

law which is reviewed nondeferentially for correctness.

In

making that correctness review, however, an appellate court
allows the trial judge a "measure of discretion . . . when
applying that standard to a given set of facts."
869 P.2d 932, 939 (Utah 1994).

State v. Pena,

The Pena court did not clarify

the precise measure of discretion to be afforded the trial court.
Instead, it stated:
Precisely how much discretion we cannot say, but
we would not anticipate a close, de novo review.
On the other hand, a sufficiently careful review
is necessary to assure that the purposes of the
reasonable-suspicion requirement are served,
[footnote omitted].
Pena, 869 P.2d at 939.
In the present case, the parties agreed to submit the
transcript of the preliminary hearing to the trial judge as the
evidentiary basis for her ruling on the motion to suppress.
R. 56.

Although Pena requires that a measure of discretion must

be afforded the trial judge, in this case where the trial judge
made finding^ after reviewing a transcript rather than live
testimony, such discretion should be minimal and the review by
this Court closer to a de novo review.

PRESERVATION OF ARGUMENT
On September 21, 1994, Appellant moved the district court
to suppress the drug evidence on the grounds that the arresting
officer had violated Appellant's rights to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures as guaranteed by the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I,

2

Section 14 of the Utah Constitution.
Appellant's motion to suppress.

The court denied

R. 16, 53-91.

Appellant

thereafter entered a conditional plea of guilty pursuant to State
v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah App. 1988), on September 26, 1994.
R. 18-20, 93-107.

Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal with

the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County on November
9, 1994.

R. 33-4.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a judgment and conviction for
Attempted Possession of a Controlled Substance, a class A
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2) (a) (i) &
(b) (1953 as amended), and Possession of a Controlled Substance,
a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§ 58-37-8(1) (e) (1953 as amended).

Appellant moved the court to

suppress the cocaine and marijuana on the grounds that the
arresting officers had violated his right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures as guaranteed by the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I,
Section 14 of the Utah Constitution.

R. 53-92.

Appellant's motion on September 21, 1994.

The court denied

R. 16. 1

Appellant

entered his conditional plea of guilty on September 26, 1994.
R. 18-20, 94-106.

The trial court sentenced Appellant on

1

The trial judge reviewed a portion of the preliminary
hearing transcript as the basis for her ruling. A copy of the
preliminary hearing transcript (PHT. 1-20) is contained in
Addendum B.
3

October 31, 1994 to one year in the Salt Lake County Jail.
R. 31-2.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On July 27, 1994, at approximately 6:53 p.m., Salt Lake
City Police officer Kenneth Dailey ("Officer Dailey") was
patrolling the Pioneer Park area on his motorcycle.

PHT. 2.

The

patrol was part of what he termed an "informal" effort to "clean
up the area."

PHT. 8.

According to Officer Dailey, the Pioneer

Park area is well known for drug trafficking.

PHT. 2, 8.

As Officer Dailey turned from 200 South heading north on
500 West, he saw two men about one-half block away on the west
sidewalk of 500 West.

PHT. 9.

The two men were facing each

other and were facing away from Officer Dailey.
appeared to be talking to one another.

PHT. 9-10.

PHT. 10, 17.

They

Richard

Rodriguez ("Rodriguez" or "Appellant") was straddling his bicycle
with his feet on the ground.

PHT. 9-10, 12.

The other

individual, according to Officer Dailey, "was dressed different
from the usual person we're seeing in that area."
golf shirt, shorts and tennis shoes.

He had on a

PHT. 5.

As Officer Dailey got closer to the two, he saw the man
in the shorts pull something green out of his pocket.

Officer

Dailey "felt it was money" because "it was green" and "[i]t was
like a wad and it looked like money."
shorts put the

PHT. 10.

The man in

money back in his pocket when Officer Dailey was

within about 25 feet.

PHT. 3.

Officer Dailey testified that he
4

had no idea of the relationship between the two individuals on
the sidewalk when he first saw them, that Appellant made no
attempt to reach out or take the money from the other individual,
and that Appellant did not do anything that was in violation of
the law.

PHT. 11-12.

Officer Dailey acknowledged that at that

point he had only a "hunch" that something was going on.
PHT. 17.
As the two individuals began to separate, Office Dailey
ordered them to stop.

PHT. 3.

Officer Dailey told Rodriguez and

the other man that the police were having a problem with drug
activity in the area, that he felt like there was a drug
transaction going on, and that they were to wait until another
officer arrived.

PHT. 3, 11.

At that point, according to

Officer Dailey, the two individuals were not free to leave.
13.

Another officer arrived.

PHT.

PHT. 3.

Officer Dailey testified that after he told Appellant and
the other man that he thought they were involved in a drug
transaction, "[t]heir response was that both of them said that I
could search them."

PHT. 3.2

Officer Dailey believed

Appellant's response gave him permission to search Appellant's
person.

PHT. 14.

Officer Dailey searched Appellant and found

marijuana in his shoe.
arrest.

PHT. 5.

PHT. 4.

Appellant was then placed under

The other officer turned over Appellant's bike

to check if it was stolen, and some white powder spilled out of a

2

go.

The officers "field carded" the other man and let him
Officer Dailey apparently did not know his name. PHT. 5.
5

container located in a white plastic sack hanging from the
handlebars of Appellant's bike.

PHT. 5.

the white substance to be cocaine.

A field test revealed

PHT. 6.

On September 21, 1994, Appellant made a motion to
suppress the drug evidence based on a violation of his rights to
be free from an unreasonable search and seizure under the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I,
Section 14 of the Utah Constitution.

The trial court judge ruled

that the officers' detention was a "level II" detention and
therefore required that Officer Dailey have a reasonable
articulable suspicion to justify the detention.

R. 78-80.

The

judge found there to be reasonable suspicion based on the
following circumstances:
He [Officer Dailey] saw these two individuals.
While this was in a high drug trafficking area,
he saw Mr. Rodriguez on a bicycle, sort of not
peddling but moving his bicycle along with his
feet toward the other individual. And the other
individual is dressed in what appeared to the
officer to be something like a tennis outfit,
shorts and a Polo kind of shirt. And that he saw
this individual take out of his pocket a wad of
money, what appeared to him to be money.
R. 80.3

See Addendum C for transcript of trial judge's oral

findings.

3

These Findings of Fact were taken from the transcript
of the proceeding on the motion to suppress of September 21,
1994. No written Findings of Fact or Conclusions of Law were
prepared and made a part of the record, even though the court
requested that the State prepare such Findings and Conclusions.
R. 87.
6

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court correctly concluded that a level two
detention occurred in this case where the officer told Appellant
to stop and Appellant thereafter was not free to leave.

The

trial court incorrectly concluded that the officer had a
reasonable suspicion to detain Appellant where the officer
acknowledged that he simply had a hunch that a drug transaction
had occurred.

Any alleged consent to search flowed directly from

the illegal detention and was the result of police exploitation
of that illegality.

The illegal detention was not attenuated

from any alleged consent.

Furthermore, the State did not argue

below that consent vitiated the Fourth Amendment violation in
this case.

ARGUMENT
POINT. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE
ERROR IN DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS
EVIDENCE WHICH WAS SEIZED IN VIOLATION OF THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT.
An individual has the right to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures as guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment to
the United States Constitution.4

"No right is held more sacred,

or is more carefully guarded, by the common law, than the right
of every individual to the possession and control of his own
person, free from all restraint or interference of others unless
by clear and unquestionable authority of law."

Union

Pac. R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891).

7

In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), the United States
Supreme Court carved a limited exception to the probable cause to
arrest requirement under the Fourth Amendment.

Pursuant to

Terry, a limited investigatory stop is permissible when the
officer observes unusual conduct which leads to a "reasonable
suspicion" that criminal activity may be afoot.

Id. at 30.

However, the officer must be able to point to specific and
articulable facts justifying the detention.

Id. at 21.

A brief

detention of an individual is justified when the officers "have a
reasonable suspicion, based on objective facts, that the
individual is involved in criminal activity."

Brown v. Texas,

443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979); see Florida v. Rover, 460 U.S. 491, 498
(1983) .
The "reasonable suspicion" standard is codified in Utah
Code Ann. § 77-7-15 (1995).
85, 88 (Utah App. 1987).

See also State v. Truiillo, 739 P.2d

The statute provides:

A peace officer may stop any person in a public
place when he has a reasonable suspicion to
believe he has committed or is in the act of
committing or is attempting to commit a public
offense and may demand his name, address and an
explanation of his actions.
Under this statute, a police officer may make an investigatory
stop of an individual after the officer has formed a reasonable
suspicion, based on objective facts, that the individual is

4

Appellant has a similar right under Article I,
Section 14 of the Utah Constitution. Appellant does not,
however, make a distinct argument under the Utah Constitution in
this case.
8

engaged in or about to engage in or has engaged in criminal
activity.

State v. Carpena, 714 P.2d 675 (Utah 1986); see Brown

v. Texas, 443 U.S. at 51.

The officer must be able to articulate

what it is about the observed objective facts that give rise to
an inference of criminal activity.

Otherwise, the officer has

only a hunch which will not justify a stop.
P.2d 537, 541 (Utah App. 1990).

State v. Menke, 787

For the facts to be objectively

reasonable, the court must ask, "would the facts available to the
officer at the moment of the seizure or the search 'warrant a man
of reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was
appropriate?"

Terry v. Ohio, 399 U.S. at 21-22.

Courts consider

the totality of the circumstances in determining whether an
officer had a reasonable suspicion to justify a stop.

See State

v. Potter, 863 P.2d 40, 43 (Utah App. 1993) ("There is no bright
line test for determining if reasonable suspicion to stop exists.
Rather, courts must look to the totality of the circumstances.");
State v. Munsen, 821 P.2d 13 (Utah App. 1991) (court looks to the
totality of the circumstances in determining whether reasonable
suspicion existed to make an investigatory stop).

A. THE TRIAL JUDGE CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT THE
OFFICERS MADE A "LEVEL II" DETENTION OF
APPELLANT.
Not all police citizen encounters require a reasonable
suspicion.

In State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616, 617-18 (Utah 1987)

(per curiam) (quoting United States v. Merrett, 736 F.2d 223, 230
(5th Cir. 1984), cert, denied, 496 U.S. 142, 106 S.Ct. 2250
9

(1986)), the Utah Supreme Court recognized three levels of police
citizen encounters:
(1) an officer may approach a citizen at anytime
[sic] and pose questions so long as the citizen
is not detained against his will; (2) an officer
may seize a person if the officer has an
"articulable suspicion" that the person has
committed or is about to commit a crime; however,
the "detention must be temporary and last no
longer than is necessary to effectuate the
purpose of the stop"; (3) an officer may arrest a
suspect if the officer has probable cause to
believe an offense has been committed or is being
committed.
In State v. Bean, 869 P.2d 984, 985-87 (Utah App. 1994),
this Court discussed the distinction between level one encounters
and level two detentions.

This Court stated in part:

A level one stop "is a voluntary encounter
where a citizen may respond to an officer's
inquiries but is free to leave at any time."
State v. Jackson, 805 P.2d 765, 767 (Utah App.
1990), cert, denied, 815 P.2d 241 (Utah 1991);
accord State v. Carter, 812 P.2d 460, 463 (Utah
App. 1991), cert, denied, 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah
1992). "[A] seizure within the meaning of the
fourth amendment does not occur when a police
officer merely approaches an individual on the
street and questions him, if the person is
willing to listen." State v. Truiillo, 739 P.2d
85, 87-88 (Utah App. 1987) (citing Florida v.
Rover, 460 U.S. 491, 498, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 1324,
75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983)). Such consensual,
voluntary discussions between citizens and police
officers are not seizures subject to Fourth
Amendment protection. Jackson, 805 P.2d at 768.
In contrast, a level two stop, or a seizure
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment,
occurs when the officer "'by means of physical
force or show of authority has in some way
restrained the liberty'" of a person. United
States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 552, 100
S.Ct. 1870, 1876, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980) (quoting
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n. 16, 88 S.Ct.
1868, 1899 n. 16, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)); accord
Truiillo, 73 9 P.2d at 87. "When a reasonable
10

person, based on the totality of the
circumstances, remains, not in the spirit of
cooperation with the officer's investigation, but
because he believes he is not free to leave a
seizure occurs." Truiillo, 739 P.2d at 87. "The
test for when the seizure occurred is objective
and depends on when the person reasonably feels
detained, not on when the police officer thinks
the person is no longer free to leave." State v.
Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 786 (Utah 1991); accord
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554, 100 S.Ct. at 1877;
Jackson, 805 P.2d at 767.
This court has recognized circumstances
that, when considered in light of all other
circumstances, tend to indicate a seizure has
occurred: "'the threatening presence of several
officers, the display of a weapon by an officer,
physical touching of the person of the citizen,
or the use of language or tone of voice
indicating that compliance with the officer's
request might be compelled.'" Truiillo, 739 P.2d
at 87 (quoting Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554, 100
S.Ct. at 1877) .
Bean, 869 P.2d at 986.

In Bean, this Court held that "the trial

court was correct in concluding the initial encounter . . .
qualifies as a level one stop."

This Court based its

determination in part on the fact that only one officer was
present and the officer "used no lights or sirens, and did not
call out to defendant or tell him he must stay."

Bean, 869 P.2d

at 987 (emphasis added); see also State v. Smith, 781 P.2d 879,
881 (Utah App. 1989) ("level one" or "voluntary" encounters are
police citizen encounters in which citizens "are free to leave
any time they wish").
In the present case, the trial jude correctly ruled that
Officer Dailey's detention of Appellant was a "level two" stop
which required that the officer have a reasonable articulable
suspicion to justify the detention.
11

See Deitman, 739 P.2d at

617-18.

The officer initially ordered Appellant to stop.

PHT. 3.

As the trial judge noted, the officer then told the two

that he thought they were involved in a drug transaction and that
they were waiting for another officer to arrive.
11.

R. 79; PHT. 3,

Indeed, Officer Dailey acknowledged that Appellant and the

other man were not free to leave at that point.

PHT. 13.

Pursuant to Smith, Deitman and Bean, this encounter where the
officer told Appellant to stop, then told Appellant that they
were waiting for a backup officer to arrive, and Appellant was
not free to leave involved a "level two" encounter, requiring a
reasonable articulable suspicion to justify the detention.
Unlike Bean, more than one officer was involved, and Officer
Dailey called out to Appellant and ordered him to stop.

The

trial judge therefore correctly concluded that the officer must
have a reasonable articulable suspicion to justify the detention.

B. THE TRIAL JUDGE INCORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT
THE OFFICER HAD A REASONABLE ARTICULABLE
SUSPICION TO JUSTIFY THE DETENTION.
The trial court found that Officer Dailey had a
reasonable articulable suspicion justifying the detention of
Appellant.

R. 86.

The court based its finding on the following:

(1) Appellant was in a high drug trafficking area, (2) Appellant
was straddling a bicycle and moving it along with his feet toward
another individual with whom Appellant spoke briefly, (3) the
other individual was dressed in something akin to a tennis
outfit, and (4) the other individual took what appeared to be a
12

wad of money out of his pocket and then replaced it.

R. 80, 85.

As defense counsel argued in this case, the behavior
witnessed by the officer was "wholly consistent with innocent
conduct."

R. 81.

The officer did not know the relationship

between the two men.

The conduct occurred near the homeless

shelter and could have involved panhandling or a number of other
innocent actions.

R. 81-82.

Appellant made no effort to reach

for the money and did nothing illegal.
Under the totality of the circumstances, the conduct
observed by Officer Dailey did not give rise to a reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity.

The officer himself acknowledged

that he only had a "hunch" when he approached Appellant.

PHT.

17.

See

A "hunch" is not sufficient to justify a detention.

State v. Lovecrren, 829 P.2d 155, 159 (Utah App. 1992); Truiillo,
73 9 P.2d at 88.

Nor do the factors relied on by the trial court

demonstrate that the officer had a reasonable suspicion.
First, the fact that Appellant was in a high drug
trafficking area is insignificant to a reasonable suspicion
determination.

In Truiillo, 739 P.2d at 89, this Court held that

the officers did not have reasonable suspicion to detain the
defendant where the initial stop was based on the lateness of the
hour and the location was in a high crime area.

In Brown v.

Texas, the Court stated, "The fact that appellant was in a
neighborhood frequented by drug users, standing alone, is not a
basis for concluding that appellant himself was engaged in

13

criminal conduct."

Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. at 52.

In Gipson v.

State, 537 So.2d 1080, 1081 (Fla. App. 1 Dist. 1989), the court
stated that the flight of a defendant from an approaching
officer, even in a high crime area, does not give rise to
reasonable suspicion to justify a stop.

See also Johnson v.

State, 610 So.2d 581, 583 (Fla. App. 1 Dist. 1992) (a drug
suspect's attempt to conceal something in a known high crime area
was not enough to justify an investigatory stop).
In the present case, Appellant had every reason to be in
this so-called "high drug traffic area."
nearby as are a park and restaurants.

The homeless shelter is

The fact that drug

trafficking occurs in this area does not suspend the Fourth
Amendment protections.

Indeed, given the fact that many homeless

people are in this area because of the shelter and park, officers
and courts should take care to assure that the Fourth Amendment
protections are given full force in this area and that officers
are not given free rein to "shake down" these individuals.
Second, the fact that Appellant was straddling a bicycle
and moving it along by his feet towards the other individual is
irrelevant to a reasonable suspicion determination.

Such conduct

is not unlawful and is in no way consistent with any type of
illegal activity.

See Truiillo, 739 P.2d at 89.

In fact, it is

proper for a person riding a bike to place his feet on the ground
and straddle the bike when approaching another individual with
whom the person is going to speak.

Officer Dailey testified at

the preliminary hearing that Appellant was not in violation of
14

any law.

PHT. 14.

Nor does the fact that the other person was dressed
differently in something akin to a tennis outfit support a
reasonable suspicion determination.

PHT. 5; R. 80.

Reasonable

suspicion by an officer must go to the particular individual
thought to be involved in criminal activity.
Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417, 418 (1981).

United States v.

In State v. Potter, 863

P.2d 40, 43 (Utah App. 1993), this Court stated that the officer
must be able to point to unlawful or suspicious behavior which
connects the detainee to the suspected criminal activity.

In

this case, the other individual, not Appellant, was the person
who the officer thought was out of place.

Therefore, the other

individual's manner of dress should not be considered in
determining whether the officer had a reasonable suspicion to
detain Appellant.

Additionally, persons who dress differently or

are from different socioeconomic or racial groups can converse
briefly with each other without raising a suspicion that criminal
activity is afoot.
The fact that Appellant was briefly speaking with an
individual who had a green wad which looked like money (PHT. 10)
also does not raise a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity
was afoot.

In State v. Potter, 863 P.2d 40 (Utah App. 1993),

this Court stated that the police officer "must be able to
articulate some unlawful or suspicious behavior connecting the
detainee to the suspected criminal activity."

Id. at 43.

In the

present case, Appellant did not reach for or possess the item
15

which looked like a wad of money to the officer.

The other

individual is the person who withdrew the wad from his pocket,
then replaced it.

Furthermore, many innocent explanations exist

for reaching into one's pocket and removing what appears to be
money.
Various courts have held that where officers see two
people converse but do not see an actual exchange of money, the
officers do not have a reasonable suspicion to justify a
detention.

In State v. Ellington, 495 N.W.2d 915 (Neb. 1993),

the court held that the officer did not have reasonable suspicion
of drug-related activity.

The stop was based upon the fact that

the individual was leaning into a parked car in a high crime
area.

When the officer approached, the individual walked away.

The court stated that the officer would have needed to have more
articulable facts, such as an exchange of money or an object
between the two, the defendant placing something in his pocket, a
recent tip as to the illegality, or the observation of other
similar encounters by the defendant in the area, in order to make
the stop permissible.

In the present case, none of the above

factors were present.

Appellant never possessed the wad of money

(PHT. 11-2), Officer Dailey was not responding to a recent tip of
drug activity in that area (PHT. 7 ) , nor had Officer Dailey
observed other similar activity by Appellant (PHT. 11).
In Gipson v. State, 537 So.2d 1080 (Fla. App. 1 Dist.
1989), the court stated that the mere suspicion of criminal
activity is not enough to justify a stop.
16

Even though the

officers were in a high crime area, observed the defendant
engaging in what appeared to be a drug transaction, and the
defendant fled from the officers when they approached, there was
not a reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant.

The officers

had never observed an exchange of drugs or money or suspected the
defendant in another crime.
The facts in Brown v. Texas, where the United States
Supreme Court held that the officer did not have a reasonable
suspicion, are similar to the facts in the present case.

In

Brown v. Texas, the officer observed two men walking away from
each other in an area with a high incidence of drug trafficking.
The officer "believed the two were together or about to meet"
when the police car appeared.

Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. at 48.

The officer detained the defendant but not the other individual.
In concluding that the detention violated the Fourth Amendment,
the Court stated:
The flaw in the state's case is that none of
the circumstances preceding the officers'
detention of appellant justified a reasonable
suspicion that he was involved in criminal
conduct.
[The officer] testified . . . that the
situation in the alley "looked suspicious," but
he was unable to point to any facts supporting
that conclusion.
[footnote omitted]. There is
no indication in the record that it was unusual
for people to be in the alley. The fact that
appellant was in a neighborhood frequented by
drug users, standing alone, is not a basis for
concluding that appellant himself was engaged in
criminal conduct. In short, the appellant's
activity was no different from the activity of
other pedestrians in that neighborhood.
Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. at 52.
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Under the totality of the circumstances of this case, the
detention of Appellant violated the Fourth Amendment; the fruit
of that illegal detention should have been suppressed.

C. THE ALLEGED CONSENT DOES NOT VITIATE THE
ILLEGAL DETENTION.
Officer Dailey testified that when he told Appellant and
the other individual that he thought a drug transaction was
occurring, the "response" of both men was that the officer could
search them.

PHT. 3.

No other testimony was taken regarding a

consent to search by Appellant.

Appellant argued that any

"consent flow[ed] directly from the illegal detention" and that
there was no attenuation between the illegality and the alleged
consent to search.

R. 64-5.

The State did not argue that consent vitiated the prior
illegality.

Instead, the State took the position that the stop

involved a level one, consensual encounter.

Nor did the trial

judge address the consent issue or rely on consent as a basis for
upholding the stop.

In addition, a review of the evidence

demonstrates that Appellant did not validly consent to a search
under the two-prong test articulated in State v. Thurman, 846
P.2d 1256 (Utah 1993), and State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684 (Utah
1990) .
"[A] defendant's consent to a search following illegal
police activity is valid under the Fourth Amendment only if both
of the following tests are met:

(i) The consent was given

18

voluntarily, and (ii) the consent was not obtained by police
exploitation of the prior illegality."

State v. Thurman, 846

P.2d at 1262 (citing State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 688).
A determination of whether the consent was obtained by
police exploitation of the prior illegality is synonymous with a
determination of "whether the 'taint' of the Fourth Amendment
violation was sufficiently attenuated to permit introduction of
the evidence."

Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1263 (quoting New York v.

Harris, 495 U.S. 14, 19 (1990) (citing United States v. Crews,
445 U.S. 463, 471 (1980))).

The purpose for suppressing tainted

evidence "is that the Fourth Amendment should not permit law
enforcement to "ratify their own illegal conduct by merely
obtaining a consent after the illegality has occurred."

Thurman,

846 P.2d at 1262 (quoting Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 689). The
prosecution has the burden in the trial court of establishing
that police did not exploit the initial illegality.

Thurman, 846

P.2d at 1263.
In Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1263, the Utah Supreme Court
emphasized that "the exploitation analysis 'always should be
conducted with the deterrent purpose of the Fourth Amendment
exclusionary rule sharply in focus . . . .'"
v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975)).

Id. (citing Brown

In conducting the

exploitation analysis, courts consider (1) "the purpose and
flagrancy" of the misconduct, (2) the "'temporal proximity'" of
the illegality and the consent," and (3) "the presence of
intervening circumstances."

Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1263 (quoting
19

Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 691 n. 4 (citing Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S.
at 603-04)).
In considering the "purpose and flagrancy" factor, courts
consider whether there was a "'purpose in engaging in the
misconduct" and whether the misconduct was flagrantly abusive or
otherwise a "pretext for collateral objectives."
P.2d at 12 64.

Thurman, 846

The Thurman court recognized that misconduct aimed

at obtaining consent will almost always require suppression of
the evidence.

Id.

Indeed, the court stated that "if the purpose

of the misconduct was to achieve the consent, suppression of the
resulting evidence clearly will have a deterrent effect and
further analysis rarely will be required."

Id.

In the present case, the initial illegal detention
appears to be intentional.
merely had a "hunch."

The officer acknowledged that he

Case law establishes that a "hunch" does

not create the constitutionally required reasonable suspicion.
The officer made the initial detention in order to ultimately
search Appellant.

Implicit in the officer's hunch that Appellant

was trying to sell drugs was a hunch that Appellant had drugs in
his possession.

The illegal detention in this case was made with

the purpose of obtaining consent or some other means to search
Appellant and pursue the officer's hunch.

The State did not bear

its burden in the trial court of establishing that the initial
illegal detention was made for any purpose other than to obtain
consent to search.

The purpose and flagrancy factor therefore

weighs heavily in favor of suppression.
20

Unlike the situation in Thurman, the purpose of the
illegal detention in this case appears to have been an attempt to
facilitate a search for drugs.

The officer did not evidence any

safety concern and he was not acting under a valid warrant, as
was the case in Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1274.
The alleged consent was made immediately after the
officer informed Appellant of the detention.

The illegality and

the alleged consent were therefore very close in time.

No

intervening circumstances separated the illegality from the
consent.
The situation in this case contrasts with that in Thurman
where five hours had passed since the illegal entry and "the
frenzy of the illegal entry and subsequent search had abated and
Thurman had been advised of his Miranda right for a second time."
Thurman at 1274.

In this case, Appellant was not mirandized

prior to the alleged consent.
circumstances occurred.

No time passed and no intervening

Under these circumstances, the taint of

the illegal detention was not attenuated and the officer
exploited the illegality.

There is a tremendous deterrent value

to suppressing this evidence given the circumstances of this
case.

Furthermore, the potential for abuse would be great if

this Court were to uphold the admission of evidence based on a
consent theory in circumstances such as this.

21

CONCLUSION
Appellant respectfully requests that this Court reverse
his conviction and remand this case for a new trial.

SUBMITTED this 3AX

day of August, 1995.

JOAN C. WATT
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

MARK ft. MOFFAT/
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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ADDENDUM A

77-7-15

UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

burden to show reasonable and probable cause
for believing items offered for sale had been
unlawfully taken by the detained or arrested
person; this section in essence codifies the preexisting common law defense of probable cause
to effect an arrest and expands it to incorporate
specific private persons in the shoplifting context. Terry v. Zions Co-op. Mercantile Inst., 605
P.2d 314 (Utah 1979).

owed; thus section did not shield auto dealer
from liability for false imprisonment where
customer drove away in new truck after leaving
check for less than purchase price dealer was
demanding and dealer called police and asked
that truck be picked up, saying there had been
a theft. Greenwell v. Canyon Lincoln Mercury,
Inc., 575 P.2d 688 (Utah 1978).

Evidence of prior conviction.
Where customer sued merchant for malicious
prosecution, false arrest and false imprisonment arising from alleged shoplifting incident
and introduced evidence the incident left her
severely depressed and suicidal, merchant
which wished to introduce evidence of a prior
shoplifting conviction and its surrounding facts
as affecting the issue of damages was properly
restricted to showing fact of the prior act and
the identity of the party involved in view of,
inter alia, the similarity of the incidents and
substantial likelihood of confusing the jury.
Terry v. Zions Co-op. Mercantile Inst., 605 P.2d
314 (Utah 1979).

—Specific cases.
There was sufficient evidence upon which to
base a jury verdict denying damages for false
arrest, where plaintiff, an eighteen-year-old
motorcycle rider, had placed a small article of
merchandise in his helmet, justifying a reasonable suspicion that he was shoplifting. Fuller v.
Zinik Sporting Goods Co., 538 P.2d 1036 (Utah
1975).

Liability.
—Acquittal.
Store that had probable cause to detain suspected shoplifter's sister was not liable for false
arrest even though sister was subsequently
acquitted of shoplifting charge. Davis v. Zions
Co-op. Mercantile Inst., 29 Utah 2d 336, 509
P.2d 362 (1973).
Motive for arrest.
Section offered no civil immunity to a merchant who initiated a customer's arrest for
purpose of effecting a civil remedy to collect
money owed, even if the money was lawfully

Probable cause.

—Standard.
The standard applicable to detentions and
arrests by merchants is composed of both subjective and objective elements; the merchant
must allege and prove not only that he believed
in good faith that his conduct was lawful, but
also that his belief was reasonable; even if the
crime was not in fact being committed or attempted, if the merchant in good faith believes
that such facts are present as to lead him to an
honest conclusion that a crime is being committed by the person to be arrested then he may
not be held liable for false arrest. In determining the reasonableness of the conclusion, the
test to be applied is one that is practical under
the circumstances, i.e., whether a reasonable
and prudent man in his position would be
justified in believing facts which would warrant
making the arrest. Terry v. Zions Co-op. Mercantile Inst., 605 P.2d 314 (Utah 1979).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 32 Am. Jur. 2d False Imprisonment §§ 44 et seq., 66.
C.J.S. — 35 C.J.S. False Imprisonment
§§ 14, 21 to 25, 40(4) to (7).
AX.R. — Defamation: actionability of accusation or imputation of shoplifting, 29 A.L.R.3d
961.
Admissibility of defendant's rules or instructions for dealing with shoplifters in action for
false imprisonment or malicious prosecution,
31 A.L.R.3d 705.

Construction and effect in false imprisonment action of statute providing for detention
of suspected shoplifters, 47 A.L.R.3d 998.
Changing the price tags by patron in selfservice store as criminal offense, 60 A.L.R.3d
1293.
Key Numbers. — False Imprisonment «=> 2,
10, 13, 15.

77-7-15. Authority of peace officer to stop and question
suspect — Grounds.
A peace officer may stop any person in a public place when he has a
reasonable suspicion to believe he has committed or is in the act of committing
530

ARREST, BY WHOM, AND HOW MADE

77-7-15

or is attempting to commit a public offense and may demand his name, address
and an explanation of his actions.
History: C. 1953, 77-7-15, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
State v. Roth, 827 P.2d 255 (Utah Ct. App.
1992).

ANALYSIS

Alcohol use by minor.
Avoiding roadblock.
Basis of suspicion.
Court's findings.
Drug use.
No reasonable suspicion.
Out-of-state licenses.
Prostitution.
Revoked license.
Standard.
Suspected shoplifting.
Vehicles.
Cited.

Court's findings.
Trial court erred in ruling that a city police
officer had a reasonable suspicion to justify
seizing defendant, who was seen emerging from
a 24-hour grocery store at 3:30 a.m., where the
court made only a conclusory finding that defendant's answers to questions regarding the
ownership of a vehicle in the store parking lot
were "inconsistent, vague and suspicious."
State v. Munsen, 821 R2d 13 (Utah Ct. App.
1991).

Alcohol use by minor.
Defendant's young appearance and the smell
of alcohol on defendant's breath gave police
officer a reasonable articulable suspicion, based
on objective evidence, that the defendant had
consumed alcohol and was a minor. State v.
Bean, 869 R2d 984 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
Avoiding roadblock.
Avoiding a roadblock, even assuming its legality, without more, does not create an
articulable suspicion that the occupants have
engaged in or are about to engage in criminal
activity. The act merely demonstrates a desire
to avoid police confrontation, and at best only
gives rise to a hunch that criminal activity may
be afoot. State v. Talbot, 792 P.2d 489 (Utah Ct.
App. 1990).
Basis of suspicion.
The reasonable, articulable suspicion contemplated in this section must be based on
objective facts suggesting that the individual
may be involved in criminal activity. State v.
Menke, 787 P.2d 537 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
In order to conclude that there was reasonable suspicion to justify stopping defendant, an
officer must be able to articulate some unlawful
or suspicious behavior connecting the detainee
to the suspected criminal activity. State v. Potter, 863 P.2d 40 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
When a reliable source with reasonable suspicion based on articulable facts reports the
commission of a crime and, based on the relayed facts, the dispatcher communicates the
information to the police, and the responding
officer's own observations corroborate the dispatch, reasonable suspicion exists for a stop.

Drug use.
When an officer saw defendant smoking a
cigarette, which from her training and experience she recognized as a marijuana "joint,"
while the defendant was in a vacant parking lot
in his vehicle with the windows rolled up on a
warm day, even though the defendant's activity
was conceivably consistent with innocent activity, it was strongly indicative of criminal activity and the officer had reasonable grounds to
stop the vehicle and investigate further. Provo
City Corp. v. Spotts, 861 P.2d 437 (Utah Ct.
App. 1993).
No reasonable suspicion.
Where suspects were detained on the basis of
a description by a fellow officer who had seen
them walking in the vicinity of a burglary, and
where the suspects were not observed at the
scene of the crime, or engaging in unlawful or
suspicious activity, the "reasonable suspicion"
test was not met. State v. Swanigan, 699 P.2d
718 (Utah 1985).
Detention of defendant on a city street at
3:30 a.m. was unreasonable where the initial
decision to stop was based merely on the lateness of the hour and the high-crime factor in
the area, and defendant's "nervous" conduct
was consistent with innocent as well as with
criminal behavior. State v. Trujillo, 739 P.2d 85
(Utah Ct. App. 1987).
Seizure of defendant's automobile was invalid, where his initial stop for driving in the
left lane had been used as a pretext to support
the arresting officer's "hunch" that defendant
was engaged in illegal activity. State v. Sierra,
754 P.2d 972 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
No reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.
See State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah Ct. App.
1988).
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Art. I, § 14

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH

Sec. 14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden — Issuance of
warrant.]
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and
no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing
to be seized.
History: Const. 1896.
Cross-References. — Controlled Substances Act, search warrants, § 58-37-10.

Liquor, search,
§ 32A-13-103.

seizure

and

forfeiture,

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

In general.
Administrative inspections and searches.
Automobile search.
—Inventory.
Blood samples.
City ordinance.
Consent to search.
—Who may consent.
Drugs.
Evidence voluntarily surrendered.
Exclusionary rule.
Hair samples.
Information used to support warrant.
Invalid search warrant.
Inventory search.
Juveniles.
Liquor.
Neutral and detached magistrate.
Particular description.
Plain view.
Private searches.
Probable cause.
—Veracity of witness.
Reasonable expectation of privacy.
Scope of search.
Search.
Search incident to arrest.
Search warrant.
—Validity.
Search without warrant.
—Delay before search.
—Propriety.
Standing to object to search.
—Stolen vehicle.
Stopping for criminal investigation.
Cited.
In general.
Neither under a subpoena duces tecum nor
under a motion to examine will an examination be permitted of a nature to contravene
provision against unreasonable searches and

seizures. Evans v. Evans, 98 Utah 189, 98 P.2d
703 (1940).
It is generally recognized that the legitimate
use of a search warrant is restricted to public
prosecutions, and in no event may such proceeding be invoked for the protection of a mere
private right. Allen v. Trueman, 100 Utah 36,
110 P.2d 355 (1941).
It is use to which it is put that renders property, otherwise lawful and rightful to have, use
and possess, subject to seizure and forfeiture.
Hemenway & Moser Co. v. Funk, 100 Utah 72,
106 P.2d 779 (1940).
For general discussion of fourth amendment
to federal Constitution, see City of Price v.
Jaynes, 113 Utah 89, 191 P.2d 606 (1948).
Whether a search and seizure is reasonable
is to be determined by the trial court, and evidence in plain view of the officer pursuing a
felon may be rightfully seized and such seizure
is not a violation of the federal constitutional
protection as set forth in Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643, 81 S. Ct. 1684, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1081
(1961). State v. Allred, 16 Utah 41, 395 P.2d
535 (1964).
No illegal search and seizure occurred where
police went to defendant's apartment pursuant
to a tip, were voluntarily admitted by another
defendant, saw articles taken in burglary in
plain sight on kitchen table and were shown
other stolen merchandise willingly by defendant. State v. Kaae, 30 Utah 2d 73, 513 P.2d
435 (1973).
Where, although investigation was in its
preliminary stages, police officers realized
there was a possibility that defendant had committed rape and homicide that they were investigating, and feared that he might try to escape
or obtain a weapon if he got out of their sight;
their conduct in accompanying him into his
bedroom while he finished dressing and in observing shirt with long strands of hair resembling that of the victim which shirt and hair
were in plain sight, did not constitute an unreasonable search and seizure, nor was taking
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AMENDMENTS TO THE
CONSTITUTION OF
THE UNITED
STATES
AMENDMENTS I-X [BILL OF RIGHTS]
AMENDMENTS XI-XXVI

AMENDMENT I
[Religious and political freedom.]
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of
the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances.

AMENDMENT II
[Right to bear arms.]
A well-regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the
right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.

AMENDMENT III
[Quartering soldiers.]
No Soldier shall, in time of peace, be quartered in any house, without the
consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by
law.

AMENDMENT IV
[Unreasonable searches and seizures.]
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.
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FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

STATE
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RICHARD RODRIGUEZ

By

-rf'/ryotTKltf^jfi

CHARGE:
CASE #:
PROSECUTOR:
DEFENSE:

Possession of a Controlled Substance 3°
941011948FS
Vincent Meister
Mark R. Moffat
TRAMSCili P~T

JUDGE:

Sheila K. McCleve

EXCLUSIONARY RULE INVOKED.
SWEARING IN OF WITNESSES.
FORMAL READING OF THE INFORMATION WAIVED.
DIRECT EXAMINATION
Q.

OF

Tuoce&WAf*-s
f

J

Di^r^f Court Case.
# Sz//^, acr
Court c+

Appals

Please state your name and spell your last name for the

record.
A.

It's Kenneth Dailey, D-A-I-L-E-Y.

Q.

What's your occupation?

A.

A police officer with Salt Lake City Police.

Q.

Are you a certified category one police officer?

A.

Yes.

Q.

How

long have you been with the Salt Lake City Police

Department?
A.

I've been with them four years with eight years in law

enforcement.

FILED

Q.

A total of eight years?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Who before Salt Lake City Police?

A.

The University of Utah.

Q.

Does that training include the detection and apprehension of

MAY 2 6 1995
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persons involved in drug issues?
A.

Yes.

I also worked a year of undercover narcotics. So, yes,

I've had a lot of training.
Q.

Can you tell me about your training and experience involving

drugs?
A.

I've had several classes through POST, and also been to

different seminars and stuff the year I worked narcotics in Las
Vegas.
Q.

I wouldn't know the total hours.

Let's take your attention to July 27, 1994, at 150 South 500

West, approximately 6:53 p.m.

Were you on duty at that time at

that location?
A.

Yes.

Q.

To your knowledge, is that location in Salt Lake County?

A.

It is.

Q.

What were you doing at that time at that location?

A.

I was in an area that is well known for drug trafficking.

I

work on the motorcycle squad and we were asked to go and check out
the Pioneer Park area.
Q.

Were you in uniform at that time?

A.

I was.

Q.

Were you on your motorcycles?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Is that a marked motorcycle?

A.

Yes.

Q.

What did you observe at that time at that location?

A.

I observed two males approach each other. One had pulled some
2
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money out of his pocket.
Q.

Did you actually see money?

A.

Yes.

Q.

How far were you from that individual when you saw that?

A.

Well, I got as close as maybe 25 feet before he actually put

It was in a wad in his hand.

it back in.
Q.

Then what.

A.

They started to separate and I asked them.... I got off and

detained them both and asked them to wait for another officer to
come.
Q.

Were you riding alone?

A.

I was.

Q.

What happened then?

A.

Another officer pulled up shortly and was talking to both of

them.

I explained to them what I observed and what I felt could be

going on.
Q.

What did you tell them.

A.

I told them that we were having a terrible problem with drug

activity in the area and that I felt there was a drug transaction
going on and that we were waiting for another officer to arrive.
Q.

What did they say when you told them that?

A.

There response was that both of them said that I could search

them.
Q.

What did you do?

A.

At that point, the officer was getting out of his car and so

I waited for him and we searched.
3
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Q.

What officer?

A.

Officer Wolrich.

Q.

And, huh, you're saying that they said that you could search

them?
A.

Yes,

Q.

Did you ask to search them?

A.

No.

Urn, they just blurted out the statement from both of

them.
Q.

And so you did search them?

A.

Yea, meantime for the one came back with some warrants too.

Q.

Which individual, do you recall?

A.

The defendant, uh the gentleman sitting at the defense table.

Q.

The two individuals that you observed, would you recognize

them if they were in court today?

One or both?

A.

Huh, one for sure.

Q.

Is that person in court today?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Would you point him out and describe what he is wearing?

A.

The gentleman at the defense tale in the gray jumpsuit.

Q.

Your honor, may the record reflect the identification.

Judge M:

Yes.

Q.

You searched the individuals.

Did you find anything?

A.

Yes, there's urn, in the defendant's shoe there was a bag of

marijuana.
Q.

In what shoe?

Do you recall?

A.

I don't recall exactly what shoe without reading the report
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but it was in, actually under the liner of the shoe that he was
wearing.

At that point, he was under arrest for both the warrant

and that. Urn, Officer Wolrich turned the bike over to check to see
if that was stolen.
Q.

How far were you from Officer Wolrich when this was going on?

A.

Just a couple feet.

Q.

Where was the other person with the money at this time?

A.

He had been released on just like a field card information

cause there was nothing that we felt we did have anything on him.
Q.

O.K., Can you describe that individual?

A.

He was white male, mid-thirties.

He was dressed different

from the usual person we're seeing in that area.
Q.

Describe him.

A.

He was dressed in urn like new clothes, huh, shorts looked like

he was going to play tennis. He had like a golf shirt, new shoes,
tennis shoes, urn..
Q.

That person was released. What did you do with the defendant?

A.

He was placed under arrest for the warrant and also for having

marijuana.
Q.

Tell me about the bicycle.

A.

The bicycle that I had actually seen him on and riding, there

was a white plastic sack, like your Smiths' garbage or grocery
sack, urn, on bicycle tied to the handle bars. And when the officer
turned it over, some white powder and item came out of the bag that
was on the bag.
Q.

What did you do with that?
5

09118

A:

Well they, the one, the powder that was on the ground, just

cleaned up that and then there was a container, like I said it was
a paper that we grabbed that still had some of the light powder in
it*

And we field tested that.

Q:

What did you field test it with?

A;

A cocaine test kit.

Q:

How do you know huh, that the field test kit was ok?

A:

It was indicted.

All the vials was intact, everything was

indicted and hadn't been used.
Q:

Can these kits be used twice?

A:

No.

Q:

Ok and what was the results of that test?

A:

It was positive for huh, cocaine.

Q:

Alright.

A:

We had, Officer Wolrich and I huh, I took the evidence and

And what did you do after that?

placed it in police evidence and we transported the individual to
jail.
Q:

Did you have conversation with the defendant huh, regarding

what it was that you found in the plastic sack?
A:

Yes, huh, well there was also some spontaneous comments that

were made too.
Q:

Can you tell me about those?

A:

The individual, he said that the marijuana was his, and he

smokes marijuana something to the effect huh, cause that's a
misdemeanor and the cocaine is a felony.

So that wasn't his.

claimed that the cocaine didn't come out of the bag.

He

You know.

6

00119

Q:

Where did he claim it came from?

A:

From Officer Wolrich.

Q:

No further questions•

CROSS EXAMINATION

MM:

You have been with the Salt Lake City Police Department for 4

years.

Is that correct?

A:

Yes.

Q:

And on this particular day you were on motorcycle patrol?

A:

Yes.

Q: Were you part of any huh, detail assigned to Pioneer Park area?
A:

Yes, that day I believe huh, about once a week we're assigned

to go down there.
Q:

And who assigns you there.

A:

Just our Sargent, its kind of an informal type assignment.

Q:

And you were assigned there on that particular day?

A:

Urn huh, for that ..

Q:

By your Sargent?

A:

Yes.

Q:

With what orders?

A: Its just a verbal informal, instead of going out and responding
to calls, they want us to go down and do that.

Not respond to

calls.
Q:

Go down and do what?

A:

Check just the area for the problems that have been going on.
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From everything from traffic problems to drug problems to DDT
problems but the difference is that we just don't respond to calls•
Q:

So you go down there and just investigate if there's any ••

A:

Just anything that happens*

Q:

Is that part of the zero tolerance policy that the police

department have enforce at this time?
A:

I've never heard it stated that way, other than just by other

officers.
Q:

What have your heard?

A:

What's that?

Q:

The other officers refer to it as that?

A:

Like our Captain has said that you know, we don't want kind of

a zero tolerance.

Not exactly those words but they want to take

care or clean up the area.
Q:

And your detail on that particular day was part of this clean

up effort?

Is that whats your testimony?

A:

In an informal way.

Q:

You say that this area is known for drug trafficking?

This is

an area down around the Shelter, is it not?
A:

Yes.

Q: You have been given intelligence reports about the activity in
the area, I take it?
A:

Several times, yeah.

Q:

Now, you were on your motorcycle, and that's a marked unit?

A:

Yes.

Q:

And you were wearing a uniform?
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A: Yes.
Q:

This takes place at about 6:00 at night?

A:

I wouldn't know the exact time but yeah it was probably around

there*
Q:

It was still light out?

A: Yes.
Q:

You were traveling which direction on your motorcycle?

A:

Urn, I would have been coming from 2nd South, so Northbound.

Q:

Northbound on which street?

A:

500 West.

Q: You see two men on the sidewalk. Where are they, which side of
the sidewalk?
A: Urn, there's only one in that area and that's on the West side.
Q:

The West side of 5th West?

A:

Of 5th West yes.

Q:

How far away from them were you when you first noticed them?

A:. I noticed them when I turned the corner ..
Q:

How far away is that?

A: You know its maybe half a block.
Q: They were facing which direction? First of all, Mr. Rodriguez?
Which direction is he facing?
A:

Right now?

Q:

When you first saw him.

A:

They were facing away from me.

They were facing each other.

They weren't looking my direction at that point.
2:

Mr. Rodriguez was on a bicycle?
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A:

Yes.

Q:

His back was to you?

A:

He just wasn't looking my direction.

It could have been the

side or what.
Q:

The other gentleman was ..

A:

They were facing each other.

Q: Yes, and what I'm trying to get from you is that Mr. Rodriguez
was facing which way?

The other gentleman was facing which way?

I can understand them facing one another, which?
A:

I know.

Northeast
Southwest.

I believe that Mr. Rodriquez was facing in an

direction,

the

other

gentleman

would

have

been

a

That's what I can recall.

Q:

What businesses are in that area?

A:

I couldn't tell you.

There's a bar, there's a car lot type

place and I think the one is a moving storage type place.
Q:

The two gentleman are, seem to be talking to one another?

A:

Yes.

Q: And you say you saw the one gentleman pull something out of his
pocket, isn't that correct?
A:

Urn huh.

Q:

And you were how far away when you saw that?

A:

Well as I got close to them I could see that and like I say,

when I finally realized that I felt it was money, huh..
Q:

You felt it was money?

A:

I could see that it was green. It was like a wad and it looked

like money, yes.
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Q: You have no idea of the relationship between the two men on the
side of the sidewalk when you first saw them?
A:

When I first saw them, no.

Q: And the gentleman that seemed out of place to you huh, had his
hands in his pockets?
A:

No, like I said he had his hand out of his pocket.

Q:

Did you ever see his hand in his pocket?

A:

Yeah, and he pulled the green wad out of his pocket.

Q:

They noticed you and walked away?

A:

They attempted, like I said, I was fairly close at that point

Is that correct?

and I asked them to stop which they did.
Q:

Ok, let me ask you another thing, you asked them to stop, they

would include Mr. Rodriguez and the other gentleman?
A:

Yes.

Q: Mr. Rodriguez had nothing at that point which was in violation
of the law, is that correct?
A:- No.
Q:

That's a no?

A:

No.

Q:

You didn't see Mr. Rodriguez break the law at that point did

you?
A:

Not at that point, no.

Q:

And all you saw this other individual do was pull something

that you thought was money out of his pocket?
A:

That's correct.

Q: And Mr. Rodriguez made no effort to get that money from him did
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he?
A; No.
Q:

He simply sat there on his bicycle.

A: No. Well huh, there were approaching each other like they were
getting closer•
Q: So Mr. Rodriguez is riding down the street on this bicycle and
the other man is walking?
A:

He was straddling his bicycle with his feet on the ground.

Q:

Moving the bicycle along the sidewalk?

A:

Towards the ..

Q:

And the other gentleman is walking down the sidewalk as well

towards Mr. Rodriguez.
A:

No, they weren't that far apart at all.

Urn, they were just

approaching each other and like I say, he was straddling his
bicycle and maybe just walked a few steps towards the gentleman.
Q:

At that time Mr. Rodriguez was not free to leave is that

correct?
A: No.
Q:

You told it while (inaudible) .

They started to separate,

correct?
A:

©

Yeah.
They attempted to move away from you, isn't that right?

A:

Yes.

Q:

You told them to stop?

A:

I asked them to, yes.

Q:

At that point in time, they were not free to leave?
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A:

Z explained why.

Q: My question is that they were not free to leave at that point?
Isn't that right?
A:

No.

Q:

It's not right?

A:

I just answered that were not free to leave, no.

Q:

Ok. Ok.

And you at that point in time indicated to them that

you were having problems in the area with drugs and that you felt
that there was a drug transaction going on?
A: Yes.
Q: And prior to that point in time, you had not mirandized either
individual, is that correct?
A:

That's correct".

Q:

Mr. Rodriguez c e r t a i n l y was not mirandized?

A:

No.

Q: So you made these statements to them about what you were doing
and they responded?
A: Yes.
Q:

The other person seemed out of place, is that right?

A: Yes.
Q:

And you let him go, is that correct?

A:

Yes.

Q:

You let him go because you had nothing to hold him on, isn't

After the investigation.

that right?
A:

After we did like huh, record checks and stuff like that.

Q:

How long did that take?
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A:

Just a few minutes.

Q:

He never indicated that he was there to buy cocaine?

A:

He did.

Q:

Where is that in your report?

A: Umf I just remember informally talking to him and I asked him.
I don't know if that is in my report, I just ..
Q:

It's an important fact isn't it?

A:

What's that?

Q:

That is an important fact isn't it?

A:

Sure.

I don't know if it is but I can recall it right now the

gentleman's .. He told me that he was there to do that but that
hadn't even taken place.

He was there to purchase drugs but that

didn't take place.
Q:

Yet you let him go?

A: Cause we did have anything on him. He" had no warrants. All we
had on him was .•
Q:- You had probable cause to believe that he was attempting to
purchase drugs, isn't that correct?
A: No because they were still a couple feet away.

I didn't feel,

I didn't have any drugs on him, all I had on him was money.
^•Q:

So you didn't feel he was in any way in violation of the law

himself?
^A:

N O . Other than suspicious.

Q: Mr. Rodriguez gave permission to search his person, isn't that
correct?
A:

Yes.
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Q:

He never gave you permission to search his bicycle.

A:

That's correct*

Q: Nov, you indicated in your report that the substance that fell
out of the white bag had spilled out, isn't that correct?
A:

Yes.

Q:

Isn't it true that the substance was on the sidewalJc prior to

the time that you confronted Mr. Rodriguez?
A:

No.

That's not true.

Q:

Never fotind any substance spilled out in the plastic bag that

was on Mr. Rodriguez's bicycle, did you?
A:

What's that?

Q:

Substance, there was no cocaine spilled out inside the white

plastic bag on the handle bars was there?
A: Urn, I'm not sure I understand how your saying that.
an item that came out of that with the substance.

There was

Coming out of

it.
Q:

And the substance was coming out of this item?

A:

Yes.

Q:

But none of the sxibstance was inside, the item didn't spill

inside the plastic bag did it?
A:

No.

Q:

It didn't recover any cocaine from the plastic bag itself.

A:

No.

Q:

You at no point in time mirandized Mr. Rodriguez, did you?

A:

I didn't question him.

Q:

The question is you never mirandized him did you?
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A:

No.

Q:

This individual, did you take note of his name?

A:

A field card by the other officer.

Q:

Do you know what his name was?

A:

I couldn't tell you.

Q:

You say he was a white male?

A:

Yes.

Q:

In his mid-thirties?

A:

Approximately.

Q:

Had shorts on?

A:

Yes.

Q:

And a golf shirt?

A:

Yes.

Q:

By his own admission, he was attempting to purchase cocaine?

A:

I recall him saying drugs.

Q:

Describe the item that fell out of the plastic bag?

A:- It looked to me like a crumbled up paper ball.
Q: Alright, at the time that you saw the two men, at the time that
you saw them

on the sidewalk together, you didn't hear any

conversation between them?
A:

No.

Q:

I just want to make sure that I understand what Mr. Rodriguez

was doing.

The other man was pulling something from his pocket,

Mr. Rodriguez was on his bicycle?
A:

And they were close to each other.

Q:

Close to each other.

And Mr. Rodriguez at no time made any
16
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gestxxre with his hands to take whatever the person was pulling out
of his pocket?
A:

No.

Q: At the time that you saw the two men, you had no idea what they
were doing?
A:

Urn, well huh, I don't know how to answer that question.

Q:

You had a hunch that something was going on?

A:

Yes.

Q:

That's all your honor.

FE piRgcr

VM:

Just a couple of questions your honor.

Judge M:
Q:

Go ahead.

Officer, did you search the defendant before the bike was

searched?
A:- Yes.
Q:

Was the marijuana found before the bike was searched?

A:

Yes.

Q:

Ok.

And when you approached these two individuals, could you

tell if they were communicating with each other?
A:

It looked like they were. Like I said, they were really close

to each other.
Q:

How were they communicating with each other?

\:

Looked like talking.

2:

Did you notice any eye contact?
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A:

Yes.

They were l o o k i n g a t each o t h e r .

Q:

Any p h y s i c a l g e s t u r e s b e s i d e s t a l k i n g ?

A:

Other than moving

you know, towards each o t h e r , no t h a t I

recall•
Q:

But you didn't hear what it was that they were saying?

A:

No.

Q:

Ok. Mo further questions your honor.

RE

MM:

CROSS

The individual that indicated he was there to purchase drugs,

didn't say which drugs he was there to purchase, is that correct?
A:

I don't recall that, no.

Q:

The substance that was tested to be cocaine was found in a

piece of paper rolled up?
A:- Like a ball, yes.
Q:

Like a ball?

Was it in a type of plastic twist?

A:

No, it was in that balled paper. There was leaf, what it was,

there was the paper and then a leaf on that and then the white
substance and then that was rolled up. And it partially opened when
it fell out.
Q:

So it easily spilled out then?

A:

Urn huh.

Q:

The leaf?

It is an actual leaf, a drawing of a leaf, what is

it?
IS
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A.

I didn't open it up anymore than it was opened; just sealed it

after the test.

But, it looked like me to just a normal, like a

maple leaf-type thing.
Q.

When Mr. Rodriguez was initially detained by you, you say that

he indicated that you could go ahead and search him, isn't that
correct?
A.

Yes.

Q.

You didn't do that immediately, did you?

A.

It was relatively short after that because I explained to him

that I was going to wait for my safety.

I was waiting for the

other officer to arrive.
Q.

During that period of time he wasn't free to leave.

A.

No.

It was a real short period of time and there was allot of

officers in that area.
Q.

The officer pulled' up just momentarily.

So, you detained him initially for something, you had a hunch

that this was some type of drug transaction, isn't that correct?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And Mr. Rodriguez and the other individual are detained and

you tell them why you are there, isn't that right?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And then you wait for backup.

A.

Yes.

Q.

You did nothing in that period of time to verify anything that

was going on, isn't that correct?
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A.

I didn't open it up anymore than it was opened; just sealed it

after the test.

But, it looked like me to just a normal, like a

maple leaf-type thing.
Q.

When Mr. Rodriguez was initially detained by you, you say that

he indicated that you could go ahead and search him, isn't that
correct?
A.

Yes.

Q.

You didn't do that immediately, did you?

A.

It was relatively short after that because I explained to him

that I was going to wait for my safety.

I was waiting for the

other officer to arrive.
Q.

During that period of time he wasn't free to leave.

A*

No.

It was a real short period of time and there was allot of

officers in that area.
Q.

The officer pulled up just momentarily.

So, you detained him initially for something, you had a hunch

that this was some type of drug transaction, isn't that correct?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And Mr. Rodriguez and the other individual are detained and

you tell them why you are there, isn't that right?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And then you wait for backup.

A.

Yes.

Q.

You did nothing in that period of time to verify anything that

was going on, isn't that correct?
A.

I said, I explained why I was there and the officer arrived
19
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like simultaneously.
Q.

It was a real short period.

Mr. Rodriguez indicated to you, at that point in time, that he

wasn't doing anything improper, isn't that correct?
A.

The only thing he said to me was that I could go ahead and

search him.
Q.

Meaning to you that he didn't feel that there was anything to

hide, isn't that correct?
A.

Um, that's probably what he thought.

I wouldn't entertain

what he was thinking, I don't know.
Q.

That's how you interpret it, though, isn't that correct?

A.

I didn't interpret it, but that's just what he said.

Moffat:
Judge:
Pros:

Nothing further, your Honor.
You may step down.
That's the States only witness, your honor, for the

purposes of this hearing there is a stipulation as far as the tox
report; and if I may read that.
plastic bag.

"Cocaine was identified in the

The total weight of the sample was 1.8 grams.

The

plastic bag was found to contain 4.0 grams of crushed marijuana.
Kevin L. Smith, Criminalist. "
Judge:

Mr. Moffat?

Moffat:

Your honor, we will be calling no witnesses.

Richard,

you have the right to testify today but my advice to you is that
you not testify.

Will you follow my advice?

Richard:

I will follow your advice.

Moffat:

We will submit it, your honor.
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ADDENDUM C

1

arrive•

2

M

What did they say when you told them that?

3

M

Their response was that both of them said

4

that I could search them."

Q

A

5

So the way I first read it, and as I read it

6

again, it does look as though he actually informed the

7

defendant and this other individual that when he approached

8

them that he felt there was a drug transaction going on. And

9

in light of also the dialogue that he was going to call for

10

backup, it seems to the Court that the weight of the evidence

11

is that this was not a Level I search —

12

That this was a Level II stop.

13

or a stop, rather.

Now, the question was, is there a reasonable

14

articulable suspicion as to whether these individuals were

15

about to commit a crime or were in the process of committing

16

a crime?

17

is an experienced officer with a year in narcotics

18

enforcement.

19

in a high drug trafficking area, he saw Mr. Rodriguez on a

20

bicycle, sort of not peddling but moving his bicycle along

21

with his feet toward the other individual. And the other

22

individual is dressed in what appeared to the officer to be

23

something like a tennis outfit, shorts and a Polo kind of

24

shirt. And that he saw this individual take out of his

25

pocket a wad of money, what appeared to him to be money.

And the evidence as to that is, first of all, this

He saw these two individuals. While this was
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1

Now, obviously if the officer had seen

2

Mr. Rodriguez produce something from him in exchange for this

3

money, I think it could be fairly said the witness witnessed

4

what appeared to be a completed drug transaction and there

5

would be very little or no question about the officer's right

6

to stop.

7

other side of the scale if the officer saw these two

8

individuals on the street have a brief encounter, no wad of

9

money and move on, even though it's in a high trafficking

10

On the other hand, it would be just as clear on the

area, that would be wholly consistent with lawful activity.

11

What this case turns on is whether looking at the

12

totality of the circumstances the officer had a reasonable

13

articulable suspicion.

14

Mr. Moffat, I need to ask you, is it your position

15

that the officer himself has to bring all these elements

16

together, or can the officer testify to what he observed and

17

then have that presented in the form of argument to the

18

Court?

19

some kind of running commentary on, Well, in my training

20

this, and, In my training that.

21

necessary?

22

You seem to be suggesting that the officer has to do

MR. MOFFAT:

Is that what you feel is

I would, your Honor, especially in a

23

situation such as this where we have behavior that is wholly

24

consistent with innocent conduct taking place in front of the

25

officer's eyes. And I needn't remind the Court this is in an
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